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THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION: THE CFPB AND
BEYOND
REMARKS AT THE LOYOLA
UNIVERSITY CHICAGO SCHOOL OF
LAW
MARCH 22, 2019
Richard Cordray*
I am glad to have the chance to kick off today's discussion
about the future of consumer financial protection. You have set
three excellent panels, filled with excellent panelists, on student
loan debt, usurious lending, and fintech innovation, and I join
everyone here in having a deep interest in what each of them will
have to say. I happen to know some of these people very well,
having had the chance to work alongside them, and I know them
to be deeply committed to the interests of the consumer public.
We need more of that in America today.
Let's face it - right now we are in the middle of an
Administration whose commitment to consumer protection seems
questionable at best. So, at a time when we are seeing some
amount of retreat at the federal level, I think you are quite
appropriately emphasizing in this conference that we must focus
not only on the CFPB, but beyond. And so, I am going to talk a
bit today about three things. First, what is the CFPB doing or
not doing? Second, how should we regard the innovative
financial providers - known as the "fintech" companies - and the
ways they may be using technology to advance the interests of
consumers? Third, what should we think about consumer
financial protection "beyond" the CFPB, most particularly at the
* Founding Director of the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau;
former Ohio Attorney General, former Ohio Treasurer.
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state level? And after I finish my remarks, of course, I am happy
to spend the rest of the time answering your questions about
anything you want to talk about.
First, then, as to the CFPB. We have seen that it has
taken a definite turn of direction. That was especially the case
during the transitional leadership of Mr. Mulvaney, an adamant
opponent who seemed proud of his personal hostility to the
Consumer Bureau. But the full extent of that turn is not yet
entirely clear under the newly-confirmed director. I have
criticized some of her decisions thus far, such as the move to roll
back the payday lending rule and the claim that the Bureau lacks
authority to supervise companies for compliance with the
Military Lending Act - two topics that our panelists will discuss
further. I am disturbed at the lack of zeal for exerting meaningful
oversight over sloppy and abusive treatment in student loan
servicing - another topic we will cover in more detail. But so far,
the jury is still out on many other issues. At a minimum,
however, it seems clear that the Bureau has adopted a different
stance in two key areas: enforcement and regulation. The
number of enforcement actions has declined sharply in the past
sixteen months, and the pace of pro-consumer regulations
appears to have slackened as well. There has been an avowed
rebalancing away from the interests of the consumer public to a
greater solicitude for the interests of the financial industry.
To be clear, I disagree with the main thrust of this shift
toward federal inaction on consumer protection. It is very much
out of step with the approach We took during the early days of the
Bureau and throughout my tenure. We were painfully aware of
the failings of the unreformed system that precipitated the
terrible financial crisis, with a deplorable race to the bottom in
mortgage lending that was not counteracted at all by lax
regulatory oversight. So, I think that aggressive policies for
protecting consumers in the financial marketplace are clearly
needed and justified in the economy of the 21st century. We
needed to rebalance the financial marketplace, where individual
consumers face off against some of the most powerful companies
in the history of the world. That need has not slackened. But if
the federal government is sounding the retreat now for the first
time since the Great Recession, then we need to look beyond the
CFPB and see how else we can find ways to protect consumers.
In short, where does the shifting policy environment at the
federal level leave the issue of consumer financial protection in
this country?,
One place many are encouraging us to look is to the
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advances made by new technology. The nature of the
marketplace has been transformed in the past generation. People
have always craved speed, ease, and convenience. But nothing
before can compare to life in the computer age, where our
physical limitations are simply melting away. Online commerce,
built on the mysterious power of big data, is solving the logistics
and reducing the costs of speed, ease, and convenience, and the
result is to make them increasingly available to the consumer
public.
This is an impressive and positive development in many
ways. It means that more financial choices are more broadly
available to more people. More types of consumer credit are now
available than ever before, and some very smart people are intent
on finding new ways to extend credit and financial services to
those who lack access to them. These developments also have the
potential to reduce costs, provide more consumer control, and
improve customer service. It also feels like we are experiencing
an extended Schumpeterian moment. New technology is creating
unprecedented waves of creative destruction, as many moats and
walls that previously protected stodgy rent-seekers in the
financial marketplace are starting to be torn down.
What is more, many fintech providers are quite idealistic
about seeking to disrupt the existing consumer finance markets to
make them work more effectively on behalf of consumers. They
see shortcomings and inefficiencies in the status quo, and they
believe they can figure out how to do things better. They are
commendably fearless in tackling these challenges, and they are
getting the best of many of them. The incumbent companies
often lack the same drive and initiative to try new things, because
they fear that drastic innovation may cannibalize their existing
position atop the marketplace. New startups, fueled by the
astonishing power of technology, have no such qualms.
How do these consequences of financial innovation
intersect with consumer protection? We used to spend a lot of
time talking about this at the CFPB, because we had as one of
our congressional purposes the task of helping to foster
innovation in financial services. But it was not clear how a
government regulatory agency with enforcement authority could
do that. Our typical focus was on the baseline of what companies
need to do to avoid violating the law. But that is a low threshold
that leaves much to be desired. Beyond that, companies compete
against one another for market share. Winning market share
requires satisfying the needs of customers better than your
competitors, including through innovation. We had no power to
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compel any financial providers to do that, but we could at least
seek to remove the overhang of regulatory uncertainty that might
be preventing them from serving consumers in more beneficial
ways. Therefore, we sought to do that where we could. ,
But we were also cognizant of the dangers of this new
computerized marketplace. And that is why I am skeptical of
some of the proposals we hear that are supposed to help jump-
start the fintech sector. One danger is posed by the
financialization of our economy - the mass availability of
consumer credit - which creates both opportunities and risks for
people who may get.in over their heads and ruin their financial
lives. More types of credit, and more complex credit products,
are now available to more consumers than ever before. And once
again I will stress that though that can be a very good thing, it
also raises new and substantial concerns about people's ability to
manage their credit and the effects on their financial health.
Another danger comes from the very nature of speed, ease, and
convenience. Many consumer choices are small and simple
enough, but some are more complicated, and can be quite
consequential. For consumers who don't understand all the
ramifications, hasty decisions can lead to lasting regrets. Yet
another danger stems from the nature of the online medium,
where greater anonymity or sheer unfamiliarity with the other
party can. facilitate fraud and other forms of exploitation, further
encouraged by the evidently greater difficulties in effectively
enforcing the law, in a borderless world of commerce where the
enforcement officials are still quite border-constrained. Yet
another source of danger is the threat to our data security and our
privacy in all the information that is being amassed about us,
often without our full awareness of what may happen to us as a
result.
It has become fashionable for regulators to think and talk
about all these technological developments in the financial
marketplace as something that might be best addressed by the
concept of a "regulatory sandbox." One thing that I recall about a
sandbox, from when our twins were small, is that nobody quite
knows what exactly is going on in there. The same seems to me
true of the regulators who bounce that term around rather
casually in their conversations. But one thing it certainly should
not be is a mindless "regulation-free" zone. There are many
dangers in this post-modern abstract marketplace, and people can
get hurt in a sandbox just as much as they can anywhere else. So
as regulators seek to foster innovation for consumers, they should
encourage fintech companies to meet high standards and
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principles of conduct. They should make efforts to maintain close
communication and understand and ameliorate reasonable
obstacles to their progress. But they should not do it by stripping
away the protections that have been built slowly and carefully for
consumers over many years of painstaking work.
The other place we can look for the consumer protections
that people need in the financial marketplace is to the States, now
that the CFPB and other federal regulators are in retreat. It is
worth making the effort to understand whether and how this can
work. After all, in countries like Great Britain, with a unitary
system of government, which means they lack a system of
federalism, a shift in policy at the center would be decisive,
settling the issue for the entire nation. But that is not necessarily
true here in the United States. As Justice Brandeis famously
noted, "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that
a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."
That is a promising direction. We have fifty additional
sources of law to contemplate, and we have fifty distinct sets of
public officials that we can encourage to enforce those laws
vigorously. Certainly at least some of these laws and some of
these officials are inclined to carry forward the banner of
consumer financial protection, even in conflict with the contrary
views of their federal counterparts. So, what are their prospects
of success? Can the states decide to exercise the "happy
incidents" of our federalism to step into the breach and make up
the difference?
The answer depends on the particulars of the legal
framework that controls a specific area of policy. The Supremacy
Clause stipulates that federal law is supreme and controlling,
regardless of anything to the contrary embodied in state law.
Does that mean any state law purporting to protect consumers in
a way that is different from federal law would be rendered
invalid as contrary to the federal law? Does federal preemption
thus negate state efforts to provide broader financial protections
for consumers?
Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, it seems that the answer to
that question might well have been "Yes" - that even anemic
federal laws would preempt stronger state laws to the contrary,
because of the inconsistent rules of conduct they would pose for
individuals and corporations. That is the doctrine of "conflict
preemption," which the Supreme Court has laid down to control
any instance of a state law that would interfere with the intended
4152019
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objectives of federal law. As has been determined with such
diverse commercial areas as medical devices, or cigarette labels,
or airbags in motor vehicles, even so with consumer financial
protection: if the federal law conflicts with state laws - even more
protective state laws - then a court might well hold that federal
preemption negates those conflicting state laws. That would be
true, for instance, if the federal policy were that consumer
protections should extend only so far, and no farther, as part of a
uniform national policy on how to balance the interests of the
consumer public against those of financial providers. And in the
current Administration, there is no doubt that some federal
financial officials prefer this view.
Another potential problem is where federal officials,
including at the CFPB, decide that they no longer have the same
zeal to enforce the law as was shown previously. In the field of
consumer financial protection, a shorthand phrasing of this view
might be whether federal officials should "push the envelope" in
advancing consumer protections in the financial marketplace.
Mr. Mulvaney stated explicitly that he believed I had done so,
that such an approach was undesirable or even improper, and he
made clear that he would not do so during his interim tenure. On
traditional theories of dual federalism, it was up to federal
officials to enforce federal law; state officials were authorized to
enforce state law; and never the twain shall meet. Hence a
voluntary pullback in enforcement at the federal level was
dispositive of the continued efficacy of federal law, at least while
those federal officials remained in position to impose their views.
And if federal officials could thus effectively undermine the force
of the federal laws while also claiming to preempt state laws
protecting consumers, then the depressing result would appear to
be checkmate.
But interestingly, the Dodd-Frank Act imposed important
changes in the federal-state landscape that governs consumer
financial protection. Notably, Congress changed the "default
rules." Ultimately, the controlling view on federal preemption
always lies with the Congress, and where it speaks clearly, that is
the end of the matter.
Two provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act embody these
crucial changes. The first is section 1041(a)(2) of Title X, which
says that "a statute, regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in
any State is not inconsistent with the provisions of this [Act] if the
protection that such statute, regulation, order, or interpretation
affords to consumers is greater than the protection provided
under this [Act]." This is a tell-tale provision, because it
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effectively speaks in the language of "rights." To explain this, let
me make an analogy to state constitutional law. It has been long
established that the rights guaranteed under the U.S.
Constitution are distinct from the rights guaranteed under state
constitutions and each can be given their own independent
construction. And the relationship between them is governed by
a one-way ratchet: wherever federal rights are interpreted one
way, and state rights are interpreted some other way, the state
rights can protect individuals beyond the scope of the federal
rights, but they cannot operate to undercut the scope of federal
rights. Put differently, and more simply, the federal
constitutional rights are a floor but not a ceiling of constitutional
protection against the actions of state officials.
That is exactly what this language in the Dodd-Frank Act
provides as well. If states wish to confer broader consumer
financial protections against private individuals and
corporations, they can now do so, regardless of whether the U.S.
Congress or federal officials have done so. That is the new
baseline of fairness that Congress has created under federal law
in this special realm of consumer finance. The decision by state
officials to confer broader protections on consumers as a matter of
state law is "not inconsistent with" federal law, meaning there is
no preemption of the more generous state laws.
Why should this be the new baseline? To put it bluntly,
this language reflects the notion that consumers deserve certain
rights, and where state officials choose to recognize and protect
these rights, they should have latitude to do so. In other words,
the default rule now is that "more" consumer protection conferred
by states is considered a good thing and thus is legally
permissible, despite the text of the Supremacy Clause. And since
the new default rules appear in the statute - explicitly declared by
the Congress itself - it would seem to control any efforts by
regulators to act to the contrary by trying to preempt such state
laws on their own authority, unless they have countervailing
statutory language they can cite in support.
The second major change embodied in the Dodd-Frank
Act has to do with enforcement of the consumer laws. Section
1042(a) essentially says - I am paraphrasing here - that in any
state, either the top legal official or the top financial regulator can
take action in a federal or state venue to enforce the provisions of
the Consumer Financial Protection At and its implementing
regulations against anyone who violates the Act or such
regulations, and secure remedies for any violations. The lone
exception is for nationally chartered banks, but even they can be
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subject to an action by a state's top legal official for violating not
the Act itself, but its implementing regulations. And the
exception is construed narrowly to omit any of the chartered
bank's subsidiaries and affiliates. This political compromise was
the Congress' considered response to the Supreme Court's
surprisingly pro-state holding in the Cuomo v. Clearing House
case.
Now that is a bit complicated, and it merits several
observations. First, this is a novel form of federalism, which
authorizes state officials to take the initiative to enforce federal
law directly. Why would Congress do that? I submit that it was
a farsighted response to precisely the shifting policy environment
we now have, where the federal government itself may now be
disinclined, for one reason or another, to engage in tough
enforcement of federal consumer law. Those reasons might
include an adherence to free-market ideology, or an anti-
government bias, or a desire to support the financial industry, or
agency capture, or perhaps some other reason. Maybe all of the
above. Whatever the reason may be, the Congress that enacted
the Dodd-Frank Act spoke clearly to say that it was not willing to
put all its enforcement eggs in the federal basket. It made the
express determination to authorize fifty other sovereign entities to
enforce federal law as well, at least for the most part.
This is a departure from strict notions of dual federalism,
where federal officials enforce federal law and state officials
enforce state law. Yet it seems natural enough that Congress
would want to see more robust enforcement of the laws that it has
enacted. It disrespects Congress when the executive branch
hollows out valid laws on the books through mere inaction, as
though the federal officials had not taken a constitutional oath to
faithfully execute those laws. Indeed, this provision suggests that
Congress was concerned that the consumer financial laws would
be systematically under-enforced, and so sought to expand and
strengthen the team of officials engaged in giving them teeth.
Perhaps all federal law is systematically under-enforced, since
crossing the line is subject to judicial correction and sanctions,
which may prompt caution about treading into grey areas close to
the line. Anyone who works with enough government lawyers
knows the type. Or we might recognize that limited resources
and unlimited problems tends to lead to a futile game of catch-up
that law enforcement officers never quite win.
However, all of that may be, the bottom line is that in our
enhanced system of federalism applicable to consumer financial
protection under the Dodd-Frank Act, state officials now have
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more tools and more resources than ever before, which reflects
Congress' embrace of the importance of protecting consumer
rights. For our purposes here, I am leaving aside section 1044 of
the Dodd-Frank Act, which further governs preemption issues
under the National Bank Act and contains no fewer than seven
subsections and nine sub-subsections. I will throw up my hands
and just leave the details of that classic legislative punt for the
courts to decide.
But stepping back from looking too closely at all these
intricacies, the bottom line is this: even if the CFPB is
temporarily sounding some manner of retreat from the battlefield,
we can salute the Congress for ensuring that consumer financial
protection remains alive and well. It has done so in the Dodd-
Frank Act by creating what we might call a framework of
"competitive federalism." This competitive federalism empowers
the states and their officials to expand and protect the rights of
consumers in the financial marketplace, where "more" is
understood to be "better." Thus, I say to the legal and financial
officials from the fifty states: Press forward. Test the boundaries.
Don't shy away from the uncertainties in the law. Do what you
believe is right to protect consumers against fraud and abuses.
And I urge the same to our federal colleagues, to whatever extent
they are permitted to do so. Remember the words of President
Kennedy, in his 1962 speech to Congress, calling for a Consumer
Bill of Rights. He said: "Consumers, by definition, include us all.
They are the largest economic group in the economy, affecting
and affected by almost every public and private economic
decision. Two-thirds of all spending in the economy is by
consumers. But they are the only important group in the
economy who are not effectively organized, whose views are often
not heard." The same is still true today. We must listen for their
voices, and we must act to protect them, through sound laws that
are vigorously enforced. Please know that, every day, not only I
but millions of Americans are fervently rooting you on.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Question
So, here's my question, you were talking about consumer
protection and student loans. I am still getting calls about my
student loans even though they were paid off over 40 years ago.
What can I do?
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Hon. Mr. Cordrav
That sounds like a lousy loan servicer, perhaps a rapacious
debt collector. I would file a complaint with the CFPB consumer
response center and there are things that they can do to make
sure that those calls stop. It is a commonplace problem in student
loans, and you have a right to tranquility under the law. There
are about 70 million Americans at any point that have debts in
collections allegedly. Go to consumerfinance.gov and file a
complaint. They're still acting pretty effectively in that area.
Ouestion
Could you talk about non-mandatory principles in a
regulatory sandbox?
Hon. Mr. Cordray
First of all, it's a very fact-specific situation. When you talk
about fintech providers, there's a variety of different providers
that you may be referring to. It could be marketplace lending or it
could be aggregators or any number of other businesses. There
isn't any general answer for that. The efficacy and the prospects
for the success of having certain principles adopted in the
marketplace will depend in part on the leverage that the
regulator may be able to exert over that category of businesses.
Take, for example, the work being done on faster payments,
which overlaps both fintechs and the traditional banking system.
The Federal Reserve decided it would try to encourage the
financial industry to develop a faster payment system. Under the
current system, payments often take several days to process.
Faster payments will affect both inflows and outflows and thus
are arguably neutral to the consumer, as it is ultimately kind of a
wash. But there is a clear benefit for consumers if we can achieve
faster payments, because there is a great deal of confusion right
now as consumers do not really know when payments are
happening. They do have a sense that it is not immediate, but
they do not know exactly when any given payment may land.
Where there is confusion, there is risk to consumers.
In making the effort to push the financial industry to
improve the payment system, the Federal Reserve had some
leverage over the providers and we got together with them and
determined that the push being made would include some broad
principles to help ensure that any changes made would be more
consumer-friendly. So far, those efforts have been very successful.
Extensive work is being done to upgrade the system, and all
parties have accepted and are working to abide by these
Vol. 31:3420
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principles. That is a very particular example, but it does show
that regulators can exert considerable influence over the direction
of changes in the market if they are focused and clear in the
efforts they are making.
So again, every situation is very particular, but it's not just
an empty thing to set up some standards if there is enough will to
make them stick. I am not saying that voluntary standards are a
substitute for actual enforcement when it comes to protecting
consumers. But if we can push the industry in directions that are
more consumer friendly, we should do that as well, even where
those standards may be not specifically enforceable.
Question
What advice would you give to law students about the
potential careers in consumer protection?
Hon. Mr. Cordrav
One of the things I want everyone to do is respect consumer
finance and consumer law and its importance in people's lives, no
matter who they are. The arbitration rule, which the CFPB
adopted and later was overturned by Congress, would have
allowed for more private class-action lawsuits. That is an
additional feature of consumer protection that I did not mention
in my speech. Private enforcement of law through class actions is
important and it is part of the way to deter companies from
seeking a competitive advantage by breaking the law. Some of
these students here can make a living by practicing in this area of
consumer finance law and I think that by making a living in this
way they also can be doing beneficial work. Some people think
that all plaintiff's lawyers are harmful barnacles on the Ship of
State. I don't agree with that. I would encourage attorneys and
the public to look at consumer law as a productive area of
practice. It is a reasonable system in a very American sense to
have individuals be able to assert their rights and seek to have
the courts hold companies accountable for obeying the law. In
general, more consumer protection for the most part is better. We
don't have enough of it right now.
Question
We've had comments and received questions about
sandboxes. There were no or very few applications for working a
sandbox. What is the response or counterpoint to "should it be
something that people want to use and try?"
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Hon. Mr. Cordray
I think it is understandable that companies, :especially
startup companies, can be hesitant to try new approaches in a
field that is heavily regulated.. They don't necessarily know
much about the legal and regulatory landscape. That's one of the
shocks and surprises that they might have as they enter the
financial marketplace. As they try to build a better mousetrap,
there likely are regulations they have to comply with. In that
situation, many companies shy away from dealing with the
government, which they view as a threat. It's not their immediate
instinct to run to government for help or insight. They tend to
keep their head down until they can get at least that first round of
venture funding. They need to be more responsible about
recognizing and embracing the regulatory landscape that tends to
dominate the realm of consumer finance.
But government officials need to be responsible as well.
Participation in a sandbox is not the be-all and end-all. If getting
people to participate in the sandbox means that we have to give
away all these consumer protections, that is a poor approach, at
least in my mind.
Question
What are your thoughts on litigation between state officials
and the OCC over the proposed fintech charter? What would you
say to the argument that state licensing doesn't make as much
sense for non-brick-and-mortar lenders?
Hon. Mr. Cordrav
I would say that when we talk to fintech companies and
other financial innovators, they hate federalism. They want one
answer from one person (thought it is not so great if the answer is
not the one you want). They are just depressed by the inefficiency
of the system. They hate that they have to go to many different
places to get approval to operate the way they want to.
But I think those problems are overblown. It is an
inefficiency in a sense, but not necessarily a trade-off. It has a
countervailing benefit and companies have managed to live with
it. A lot of things differ from state to state. Lots of companies
have managed to automate their compliance even though they
started off having to comply on many fronts with the laws of
multiple states. I don't think there is anything unique to the
fintech companies that means that they can't live with that same
system of federalism, as they have to do for contract law,
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property law, tort law, and the like. States do recognize that this
is a problem, but they have their own unique needs and their own
unique regulations, and many of them are finding ways to
coordinate their work to reduce some of these burdens.
As to the litigation over the OCC fintech charter, I'm not
current with the latest developments. But it is going to be
symptomatic of the next few years where the federal government
is pulling back in regulating consumer finance and the states are
pushing in, so there will be preemption fights.
Federalism is alive and well in this country. It is not going
anywhere. Just because a few people find it inefficient, does not
mean that it is unsatisfactory. It builds in a lot of protections for
people's rights, and where Congress decides, as it did in the
Dodd-Frank Act, that States can go above and beyond federal
law to protect consumers, that is the definitive word on the
subject.
As with any kind of structural issue, it is in itself sort of
neutral in its effect on policy. Federalism can be good or bad,
depending on your point of view. Federalism was originally an
obstacle that held back civil rights in this country. Now it can be
a source of expanded rights under state law that go beyond
federal rights in various areas.
Ouestion
During your tenure at the CFPB, what sector had the most
problems giving consumers transparency and how did you go
about improving that transparency?
Hon. Mr. Cordray
In answering that question, I would tend to look across the
different markets that we dealt with. In the mortgage market,
which is the one that created that crisis, inevitably a terrible
crisis, hopefully the worst of our time, Congress mandated a lot of
reform and we had many choices to make, but I think most
people would agree that we made those choices in ways that have
provided important safeguards for that important market.
One market that was not transparent at all is the credit
reporting industry. Clearly, there needed to be reform to react to
the last crisis. These companies keep reports on each of us, our
information is collected, analyzed, and then sold to size up the
kind of credit risk that we pose. People tend to assume that they
get the same off-the-shelf loan offer as anyone else, but that's not
true. And the price quoted to you might be wrong because the
information in the credit report might be wrong. You might live
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your whole life paying more than you should because of flaws in
that process that you are unaware of.
Credit reporting originated in local markets, then it grew up
into a nationwide industry almost the way weeds grow in a
garden, very haphazardly. When the CFPB first began to
scrutinize their operations, they were utterly disorganized and
had no strong compliance management. They had no idea what
to tell us about whether they were complying with the law or
what they were doing. They were just gathering information and
selling it to people. There were lots of different ways people were
doing things, and it posed extensive risks for consumers on a
broad scale. They are still massive entities with many problems.
We worked to improve their accuracy and their responsiveness,
and we sought to put pressure on them by making consumers
more aware of their credit files and the importance of their credit
scores. All of that helps bring these companies more to heel
because the consumer is more thrust into the middle of their
business and can assert their rights more effectively.
I could talk in the same kind of detail about each of the
consumer finance markets individually, but we don't have time.
Question
There is a payday lending regulation that you worked on for
many years and the current CFPB is attempting to invalidate a
key provision of that. What are your thoughts on that? And if the
Bureau finalizes the elimination of the payday rule, but Congress
then passes a measure under the Congressional Review Act to
invalidate that action, where would the law then stand?
Hon. Mr. Cordray
We did impose a payday lending regulation, which I regard
as a fairly modest requirement on the industry. We sought to
address the problem of payday loan debt traps not by outlawing
payday loans or by outlawing high-cost payday loans. Instead,
lenders simply have to make a reasonable assessment that
someone will be able to repay the loan effectively before the loan
can be made. The industry has been fighting that regulation tooth
and nail, even though the same ability-to-repay rule is now law
that governs the mortgage market and the credit card market,
where it has worked well. One interesting thing about the CRA.
Congress barely moved a muscle to invalidate the payday lending
regulation. That was never even brought to a vote in either
chamber, and a resolution to do that got very few sponsors. So we
passed a rule, and Congress had a chance to overrule it and did
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not do so; it makes little sense to me for the CFPB now to go back
and seek to rescind that rule. It is just a giveaway to the industry.
As for your further, nuanced question, I don't know the answer.
It seems to me the CRA was devised to nullify rules, not to nullify
rules themselves nullify other rules.
Question
In terms of payday lending regulations, has there ever been
any thought to providing bail bondsmen with similar regulations?
What would the effect of including bail bondsmen as predatory
payday lenders be? Would they be considered payday loans?
Hon. Mr. Cordray
Some of the jurisdictional limits of the CFPB are not quite
clear. In general, the CFPB was conceived to deal with any kind
of household credit. So there would at least be some question as
to whether that is in the CFPB's jurisdiction. However, there
would be no question whether it is under the jurisdiction of state
authorities, who are not controlled by the limitations of federal
statutes. We are starting to see significant movement toward
reform of the bail process based on individualized risk
assessments as the proper basis for deciding to detain people
rather than having it be premised on economic incapacity. There
is a growing move in that direction as a matter of policy at the
state and local level. But I'm not sure what the intersection with
the CFPB would be.
Ouestion
Do you think the bottom line is money? A lobbyist will go to
Congress and put in the money to get their ticket punched to
achieve their goals, as was notoriously said by a donor during the
Clinton administration.
Hon. Mr. Cordrav
I don't think that is quite right. I think that's the way a lot of
Washington works, but that certainly is not the way that the
CFPB as I know it worked. What happens right now is the
legislative branch of the government often is deeply divided,
leaving a lot of gridlock with only occasional opportunities for
meaningful legislation. As a consequence, entities like the CFPB
and other executive agencies have become more important
because that's where any forward action is likely to emanate
from.
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